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This Research Topic is about time-experience broadly construed, as it manifests at perceptual
and conceptual time-scales (milliseconds-to-seconds vs. longer times, respectively). Authors
representing a broad spectrum of psychology and neuroscience have contributed, introducing
novel theories, empirical findings, and methodological innovations. In this Editorial we give a
thematic overview of the exciting and diverse contents of this Research Topic. (Abbreviations: O,
Opinion; H&T, Hypothesis and Theory; OR, Original Research; P, Perspective; MR, Mini-Review;
GC, General Commentary; M, Methods).
Consciousness
Many contributors acknowledged that the experience of time is an irreducible part of conscious
experience, strongly related to the experience of being a self (Wittmann et al., 2015). Zhou,
Pöppel, and Bao (P) integrate different aspects of temporal experience into a unified biologically-
grounded framework held together by the concepts of identity and homeostasis. Berkovich-Ohana
and colleagues (H&T) locate representations of minimal self and extended self within a three-
dimensional consciousness state-space defined by time, awareness, and emotion. Fingelkurts and
Fingelkurts (O) link phenomenology to neural activation patterns, which in turn are constrained
by bodily space and the larger context, in order to construct the temporal dimensions of past,
future, and present. Martin and colleagues (H&T) consider how disturbances of the minimal
self in patients with schizophrenia are possibly related to alterations in temporal processing
typically associated with this disorder. In order to better illuminate how creative insight is
subjectively experienced, with special attention to its temporal aspects, Cosmelli and colleagues
(P) recommend neurophenomenological methodologies, integrating cognitive neuroscience with
descriptive, first-person data.
Multiple-Scales
Many contributors addressed how time is represented at multiple scales. Wackermann (O) grounds
the experience of time in a knowing, willing subject, exploring how subjective horizons determined
by human biological constraints impose various preconditions on the “notion and knowledge
of time” across multiple scales. Singularly, Bonato and colleagues (O) propose that temporal
cognitions respecting events occurring at vastly different time-scales, such as interval timing vs.
mental time travel, are nonetheless represented by a common spatial metric (Bonato et al., 2012).
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Mechanisms
Many contributors addressed theoretical mechanisms of timing
and time perception (Grondin, 2010; Matthews andMeck, 2014).
Block and Grondin (GC) argue that the time perception field
is too preoccupied theoretically with internal-clock models and
empirically with interval timing. Alternatives to internal-clock
models are well-represented in the Research Topic. For example,
Marchetti (H&T) discusses time-experience as resulting from
a process of construction performed by sampling and binding
of the contents of working memory by attention. Schweickert
and colleagues (OR) similarly emphasize the roles of attention
and working memory, introducing to the field a novel complex
span and timing hypothesis, which predicts that only secondary
tasks that are sensitive to individual differences in working
memory capacity will interfere with performance on the primary
task of time perception in a dual-task setting. Perhaps of some
importance for this notion, working memory capacity predicts
timing abilities, even when these are tested without dual-task
interference (Troche and Rammsayer, 2009; Broadway and
Engle, 2011) Gupta (H&T) proposes a new theory explaining sub-
and supra-second timing performance by calibration of neural
oscillators by sensory, motor, and feedback processes.
Perceptual Time
Experimental and theoretical work on time perception has
led to increased understanding of how people keep track
of time through multimodal perceptual processes (Grondin,
2001). Mitsudo and colleagues (OR) identify event-related
brain potentials specifically associated with equality/inequality
judgments of successive time intervals marked by auditory
cues. Mioni and colleagues (OR) present evidence in favor of
distinct timing mechanisms above and below a threshold of
1300ms based on effects of context and space-time compatibility.
Grondin (O) proposes that cross-modality influences on
perceiving time raises questions about the realism of a unitary
clock hypothesis. Van Rijn (O) demonstrates how abstract
mechanisms underlying interval timing are affected by perceived
speed, in a simulated driving task. Schaefer (O) speculates that
shared components between movement and musical imagery
may offer a window into timing and temporal skills, of
relevance to cognition beyond movement or auditory functions.
Elliott (OR) reports effects on perception due to specific phase
relationships among stimuli in backward masking experiments.
Zakay (H&T) looks at time perception in relation to information
processing load, focusing his analysis on the experience of
boredom.
Conceptual Time
Experimental and theoretical work on mental time travel has led
to better understanding of how time is represented conceptually
(Roberts, 2008; Wittmann, 2013). Ye and Song (OR) report that
in contrast to adults, the prospective bias in children seems
to be unrelated to current task demands. Roy (O) suggests
that so-called “optimistic biases,” causing people to under-
estimate how much time a particular task will take, are over-
stated in the literature. Scarf and colleagues (MR) argue that
if “spoon test” performances of children and great apes were
assessed by identical criteria, the evidence suggests the ability
for mental time travel can be observed among great apes. Logan
(O) advocates similarly for the existence of mental time travel
among nonhuman animals, focusing on certain bird species,
and proposes new research approaches to further advance this
question. Friedman and colleagues (M) describe a new immersive
virtual reality technique in which individuals can virtually travel
back in time to re-live a previous life-or-death moral dilemma,
with the opportunity to act differently the second time around.
Franklin and colleagues (O) challenge traditional concepts of
time with notions of precognition and retro-causality.
Conclusion
To sum up, the collection of articles in this Research
Topic showcases the diverse fecundity of theoretical and
empirical developments across a wide spectrum of contemporary
research into time-experience broadly construed. It should
be acknowledged that the organizing distinction between
“perceptual” and “conceptual” time-experience is really only a
heuristic; but it has enabled this Research Topic to bring into
a single view, a wide panorama of ways to think about and
investigate time-experience.
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